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ABSTRACT 
A visit to a Chinese city of any size—looking up at downtown billboards, riding public 
transport, shopping at a mall—is to be in the presence of a Chinese celebrity endorsing a 
product, lifestyle or other symbols of “the good life”. Celebrity in China is big business, feeding 
off and nourishing the advertising-led business model that underpins the commercialized media 
system and internet. It is also a powerful instrument in the Party-State’s discursive and 
symbolic repertoire, used to promote regime goals and solidify new governmentalities through 
signalling accepted modes of behaviour for mass emulation. The multi-dimensional celebrity 
persona, and the public interest it stimulates in off-stage lives, requires an academic focus on 
the workings of celebrity separate to the products that celebrities create in their professional 
roles. The potential to connect with large numbers of ordinary people, and the emergence of an 
informal celebrity-making scene in cyberspace symptomatic of changing attitudes towards 
fame among Chinese people, marks the special status of celebrity within China’s constrained 
socio-political ecology. The motivation for this article is to further scholarly understanding of 
how celebrity operates in China and to bring this expression of popular culture into the broader 
conversation about contemporary Chinese politics and society. 
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Celebrity images pervade the public spaces and private screens of contemporary China. The 
“exorbitant visibility of all kinds of celebrities” is testament to the maturation of a celebrity 
industry that feeds off and nourishes the advertising-led business model underpinning the 
media system and internet.3 Despite its increasing ubiquity, the aura of frivolousness that 
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surrounds celebrity perhaps explains why “Chinese stars and stardom rarely receive sustained 
academic attention.”4 While the professional milieux of film, music and popular culture that 
many celebrities inhabit are recognized and closely studied sites of political and cultural power, 
negotiation and contestation,5 the contours of Chinese celebrity remain relatively uncharted.6 
This is a significant gap. The capacity to reach substantial audiences and potentially influence 
society have made individual celebrities and the industry that creates and promotes them 
subject to a system of control and instrumentalization by the state. Celebrity culture is a 
powerful instrument in the state’s discursive and symbolic repertoire, used to promote the 
regime goals of orderly progress towards a modern society under the leadership of the 
Communist Party. The Chinese celebrity scene is characterized by contradictions. The industry 
is thriving, despite stringent circumscriptions applied by state and industry actors. Celebrity 
culture in China can be superficial, yet it retains a strong moral component. Despite the growing 
attraction and ease with which ordinary people can achieve celebrity status online, celebrity 
remains a “systematically hierarchical and exclusive category,” and the state, via the media and 
cultural industries, retains control of the symbolic economy in which it operates.7 By analysing 
official documents from state institutions responsible for managing China’s culture industry, 
Chinese media discourse and online platforms, this article traces the development of the 
celebrity industry in China, before discussing how and why the state attempts to control the 
parameters of the celebrity industry and individual celebrity conduct. It then shows how the 
state tries to harness celebrity as a vehicle for promoting socialist values and patriotism. Finally, 
the article identifies the emergence of an informal celebrity-making scene in cyberspace 
symptomatic of changing attitudes towards fame among Chinese people, but not the state: 
                                                          
4 Farquhar and Zhang 2010, 2. 
5 Berry and Farquhar 2006; Zhu and Berry 2009. 
6 Exceptions include Edwards and Jeffreys 2010; Hood 2015. 
7 Rojek 2001, 157. 
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identified as potentially subversive, the state has moved quickly to exert control over streaming 
platforms promising “celebritization of the ordinary.”8  
 
The emergence of China’s celebrity industry 
We understand celebrity as a multidimensional quality, the sum of an individual’s product and 
packaging, personal attributes and life beyond the professional realm. It is the celebrity persona, 
“a crafted and consolidated public projection of the real person, built in part out of film roles 
and other public appearances,” 9  that distinguishes celebrity from mere well-knownness. 
Celebrity comes in numerous forms, from “stars”, the sub-group at the apex of the celebrity 
hierarchy, to “celetoids”, ordinary people who become famous for a short time due to particular 
acts or circumstances.10 Celebrities can be found across diverse professional sectors, from 
journalists and artists to businesspeople and athletes. The highest concentrations of celebrities, 
and the major constituent of the celebrity industry and culture, are the performing arts, notably 
film and music. While China has a long history of literary, musical and folk heroes in the 
Imperial and Modern eras11 and concerted efforts were made to create “socialist stars” during 
the Mao era,12 the contemporary celebrity scene is a product of processes associated with the 
emergence of market socialism in the reform era. Economic reforms and urbanization, 
increasingly widespread prosperity and the associated rise of consumerism, commercialization 
of the media and technological change, the growth of individualism and decline of collectivist 
ways of life have all contributed to the supply and demand for celebrities.  
Central on the supply side was the emergence of a media and entertainment system 
combining control with commercialization, which created the dual constituencies of the public 
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and the state by removing state subsidies while maintaining restrictions on permissible 
content.13 In response, the media and entertainment industries were forced to adopt advertising-
led business models while keeping their output within deliberately vague, post-hoc and moving 
boundaries set by the state.14 Consciously apolitical soft entertainment formats were embraced 
as a way of achieving both ends, with substantial demand from Chinese audiences accustomed 
to a diet of ideologically-driven “edutainment”.15 Expanded media and entertainment scenes 
provided opportunities for celebrity creation, with actors and singers from Hong Kong and 
Taiwan (Gangtai 港台) leading the way.16 Over time, the various components of the celebrity 
industry, including advertising, Public Relations (PR; gonggong guanxi 公共关系 ) and 
entertainment media have expanded and professionalized their operations. Official state media 
outlets such as Xinhua (新华), People’s Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报) and Global Times 
(Huanqiu shibao 环球时报), as well as leading commercial web portals feature extensive 
entertainment (yule娱乐) sections replete with celebrity images, features and gossip. Popular 
magazines like Southern Metropolitan Entertainment Weekly (Nandu yule zhoukan 南都娱乐
周刊), Entertainment Weekly (Yule zhoukan 娱乐周刊) and Star Weekly (Xing zhoukan 星周
刊) regularly feature interviews with celebrities, reviews of popular culture and commentary 
pieces on entertainers.  Individual celebrity and celebrity-centred accounts on Chinese social 
media attract audiences in the tens of millions. The photographer anointed by Global Times as 
“China’s number one paparazzo” (gouzai 狗仔), Zhuo Wei 卓伟, has several million followers 
on Weibo.17  
                                                          
13 Zhao 2008. 
14 Stockmann 2013. 
15 Donald et al. 2002; Wen 2013. 
16 Gold 1992. 
17  Liao, Danlin. 2014. “China's No.1 paparazzo,” Global Times, 3 April, 
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/852589.shtml. Accessed 11 June 2017. 
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Absent during the Mao era, celebrity advertising endorsements returned to China in 
1988 when actress Pan Hong 潘虹 and actor Li Moran 李默然 appeared in advertisements for 
cosmetics and medicines respectively. 18  Subsequently, endorsements with foreign and 
domestic brands became a lucrative business for Chinese celebrities. There are now hundreds 
of Chinese advertising agencies and transnational advertising agencies operating as joint 
ventures, and “a majority of advertising campaigns feature celebrities” (Schimmelpfennig and 
Hollensen, 2016: 2). Chinese celebrities endorse everything from precious gems to household 
goods, with some individuals representing more than 20 different brands (Hung et al., 2011: 
6). Chinese celebrities like the actresses Li Bingbing 李冰冰  and Zhou Xun 周迅  and 
Olympian Liu Xiang 刘翔 have gained global recognition as representatives for Gucci, Chanel 
and Nike respectively. Increasingly, endorsement deals, film roles and recording contracts are 
facilitated through studios or agencies such as the Huayi Brothers (Huayi xiongdi chuanmei 华
谊兄弟传媒) film and media conglomerate. Since the first PR department was set up in 1984 
by state-owned pharmaceuticals firm Guangzhou Baiyunshan 广州白云山 , hundreds of 
Chinese PR firms, including joint ventures with major American companies like Edelman and 
Ogilvy, have been established. As China’s PR industry continues to grow rapidly, degrees in 
western-style PR are popular offerings at Chinese universities. 19  For these firms and 
practitioners to succeed in China’s PR industry, “cooperation and communication ties with 
government departments at all levels” is of critical importance.20 
The major incubators for the performing arts and sports talent pools are the state-
academies. Here, at these key sites for cultivating China’s future actors and musicians, children 
identified as having talent receive stringent training and political education. Of the top earning 
                                                          
18 Sun 2013. 
19 Yan 2010. 
20 Wu 2002, 17. 
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Chinese performing artists identified by Forbes magazine, and the celebrities with the most 
web searches per Chinese search engine Baidu, more than three quarters attended a state 
conservatory, dance or drama academy.21 Actresses Gong Li 巩俐 and Zhang Ziyi 章子怡 were 
discovered by film director Zhang Yimou 张艺谋, himself a graduate of the Beijing Film 
Academy (Beijing dianying xueyuan 北京电影学院 ), while attending Beijing’s Central 
Academy of Drama (Zhongyang xiju xueyuan 中央戏剧学院). Action movie star Jet Li (Li 
Lianjie李连杰) honed his trademark martial arts skills at Shichahai Sports School in Beijing, 
a state school informally known as “the cradle of Olympic talents”. Emergence from “within 
the system” (tizhinei 体制内) is one of the characteristics of Chinese celebrities and their 
academy training is a major source of performed or genuine gratitude towards the state and the 
work ethic they profess as professional performers. Those who don’t thank the state in the 




The Chinese celebrity industry operates within an interlinked commercial, legal and political 
structure. Guided by the Central Publicity Department (Zhongyang xuanchuan bu 中央宣传
部), the Ministry of Culture (Wenhua bu 文化部) (MOC) and the State Administration of Press, 
Publication, Radio, Film and Television (Guojia guangbo dianying dianshi zongju 国家广播
电影电视总局) (SAPPRFT; formerly SARFT) are the two key institutions that oversee 
celebrity related affairs. The MOC ultimately determines “who can perform and under what 
                                                          
21  Flannery, Russell. 2015. “2015 Forbes China celebrity list,” Forbes, 13 May, http://onforb.es/1LsRkxe.  
Accessed 17 March 2016; Baidu. 2017. “Jinri yule mingren Paihangbang” (Today’s celebrity ranking), 10 June, 
http://top.baidu.com/buzz?b=618&fr=topbuzz_b18. Accessed 10 June 2017. 
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circumstances,”22 and plays a significant role in the selection of celebrities for ambassadorial 
roles and participation in state-organized expos, festivals and campaigns. SAPPRFT has the 
power to determine celebrity appearances across the Chinese media-scape, including 
prohibiting media from featuring “celebrities embroiled in scandals”. 23  The Cyberspace 
Administration of China (CAC; Guojia hulianwang xinxi bangongshi 国家互联网信息办公
室) actively manages celebrity-related content online, shutting down 80 popular celebrity news 
and gossip accounts in June 2017 and urging host platforms like Tencent and Baidu to ensure 
a “healthy, uplifting environment for mainstream opinion.”24  
Studios and talent agencies can be punished by state regulatory bodies for their clients’ 
behavior, incentivizing them to carefully manage the celebrities they represent, and giving rise 
to an increasing number of legal firms specializing in entertainment law (yulefa 娱乐法) 
providing background checks, risk assessments, and analysis of related state laws and policies. 
Celebrity endorsements are closely monitored by the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce (Guojia gongshang xingzheng guangli zongju 国家工商行政管理总局) under its 
Code of Advertising Ethics (Guanggao huodong daode guifan 广告活动道德规范) (Li, 2011). 
The National Advertising Law (Guanggaofa 广告法), first launched in 1995, was updated in 
2015 to include endorser liability in response to problematic celebrity advertisements, such as 
the melamine-tainted infant formula produced by the state-owned Sanlu Group (Sanlu jituan 
三鹿集团) endorsed by actress Deng Jie 邓婕 that killed six children in 2008.25  
                                                          
22 Hood 2015, 6. 
23 China.org.cn. 2009. “SARFT bands media hyper on celebrity scandals,” 29 April, 
http://www.china.org.cn/culture/2009-04/29/content_17696621.htm. Accessed June 10 2017. 
24  Qin, Amy. 2017. “Chinese censors have new target: celebrity news,” New York Times, 9 June, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/09/world/asia/china-celebrity-news-wechat.html. Accessed June 11 2017. 
25  Gov.cn. 2015. “Zhonghua minzu gonghe guo guanggao fa (quanwen)” (Advertising law of the People’s 
Republic of China (full text), April 25, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-04/25/content_2852914.htm. Accessed 
October 24 2017.  
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The regulatory frameworks governing the conduct of the celebrity industry are 
supplemented by informal, soft controls, in the form of government pronouncements and state 
media editorials setting out norms and expectations. In 2015, for instance, SAPPRFT 
introduced a “Pledge on professional ethics, self-discipline for personnel in press, publications, 
radio, film and television.” Fifty organizations across the entertainment sector promptly signed 
the pledge. Speaking at the launch, actress Fan Bingbing 范冰冰 declared that “to be a good 
actor, one must first be a good person”, which notably included “abiding by the law” and 
promoting “truth, good and beauty”.26 A follow-up editorial in the People’s Daily (2015) set 
out the rationale for regulating celebrity behaviours: 
As public figures, celebrities have a huge influence on society, and are often imitated 
by fans. Although their social responsibility as public figures is not clearly stipulated, 
it is very much a moral issue (zhuyao zai daode cengmian 主要在道德层面). Because 
they influence society, they have an even greater obligation to set an example (geng 
you yiwu zai daodeshang zuochu biaoshuai 更有义务在道德上做出表率 ), and 
standard for the moral direction of society.  
Expectations about the morality of celebrity conduct and their personal “quality” (suzhi 素质) 
are not restricted to the state. As Edwards and Jeffreys note, Chinese publics care deeply about 
“the moral virtue of prominent individuals.”27 Normative values like filiality, faithfulness in 
marriage and the collective good are dominant social norms that celebrities are expected to 
conform to by the state, business and publics.28 Transgressions such as drug use or sex scandals 
can result in celebrities being forced to issue public apologies, disqualification from awards or 
blacklisting from professional and endorsement roles. Actor Huang Haibo 黄海波, for instance, 
                                                          
26  Canaves, Sky. 2015. “China’s stars promise to behave, or else,” China Film Insider, 13 November, 
http://chinafilminsider.com/chinese-stars-promise-to-behave-or-else/. Accessed 10 June 2017.  
27 2010, 19. 
28 Zhou and Whitla 2013. 
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spent six months in “custody and education” in 2014 for soliciting commercial sex, reflecting 
upon release that “as a public figure, I failed as a role model.”29 Conspicuous consumption that 
is deemed excessive by the authorities or the public also attracts censure, as actors Angelababy 
(Yang Ying杨颖) and Huang Xiaoming 黄晓明 discovered after their extravagant wedding 
ceremony in 2015.30  
While the celebrity sector is subject to circumscription and control, individual 
celebrities have used the affordances of their status to raise public awareness around LGBT 
issues, notions of Chinese-ness and filiality.31 For instance, TV host Jin Xing 金星 has raised 
the profile of transgender issues, as news anchor Chai Jing 柴静 did with pollution. Celebrities 
also support social causes through philanthropy, 32  advocacy and representation in formal 
political institutions like the CPPCC,33 and as activists and social critics.34 The punishment of 
other celebrities, like outspoken government critic and celebrity businessman Xue Manzi 薛蛮
子 , demonstrates the fine line between celebrity activism and what the State regards as 
transgressive acts.  
 
Harnessing Celebrity  
The scholarly literature on celebrity in the west has established that there is nothing accidental 
in the way that celebrities are created. Carefully mediated fabrications advanced via “chains of 
attraction”35 and representing “typical ways of behaving, feeling and thinking in contemporary 
                                                          
29 Wang, Ruiqi. 2014. “Actor Huang Haibo released after six-month detention,” SINA English, 1 December, 
http://english.sina.com/entertainment/2014/1130/759588.html. Accessed 10 June 2017. 
30 China Digital Times. 2015. “Minitrue: take celebrity groom off air,” 21 October, 
http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2015/10/minitrue-take-celebrity-groom-huang-xiaoming-off-air/. Accessed 10 June 
2017. 
31 Fung 2008. 
32 Hood 2015; Jeffreys 2015a. 
33 Jeffreys 2015b. 
34 Strafella and Berg 2015a; 2015b. 
35 Rojek 2001, 10. 
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society,”36 celebrities symbolize modes of behaviour consistent with the goals of government 
and business. 37  With notable exceptions, celebrities are generally symbols of system-
acceptance and a demonstration that “the system rewards talent and cherishes upward 
mobility.”38 In China, the State, which has long promoted role models for their patriotism, 
heroism or exemplary role-fulfilment,39 uses celebrities as a vehicle for promoting nationalism, 
traditional virtues and the pursuit of modernity. It has identified celebrities as purveyors of 
“spiritual goods” (Jingshen chanpin 精神产品), exhorting them to “perform conscientiously, 
behave respectfully” and “take the lead in setting an example” for society to follow.40 As 
Stockmann and Gallagher conclude in their article on Chinese commercial media, the state has 
learned that popular vehicles can transmit political messages more effectively than “old-style 
propaganda.” 41  Possessors of “symbolic capital” derived from constant publicity and 
deliberately crafted personas,42 Chinese celebrities have inherited the mantle of socialist role 
model, embodying accepted modes of behaviour for mass emulation. This includes exhibiting 
norms structured by class,43  gender 44  and the “continuous striving and upward mobility” 
manifest in “middle class” consumption behaviours.45 The State’s expectations are established 
and enforced through a repertoire of formal, informal and delegated control mechanisms 
described in the previous section.  
Under market socialism the State’s social engineering (shehui gongcheng 社会工程) 
and moral construction (daode jianshe 道德建设) projects increasingly take the form of 
                                                          
36 Dyer 1986, 15. 
37 Marshal 1997. 
38 Rojek 2001, 38. 
39 Edwards and Jeffreys 2010. 
40 Guancha. 2015. “Chunwan weihe bu yong “wudian” yanyuan” (Why Spring Festival does not need “tainted” 
actors), 2 February, http://guancha.gmw.cn/2015-11/10/content_17675448.htm. Accessed 19 March 2016. 
41 2011, 459. 
42 Bourdieu 1986. 
43 Evans 2006. 
44 Wallis 2015. 
45 Yu 2014. 
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“governmentalities” associated with neoliberal ideas on the management of individual 
conduct.46 As individual merit, material wealth and consumption have become the hallmarks 
of market socialist progress, elevating the “quality” and “civilization” (wenming 文明) of the 
Chinese people has been identified as a prerequisite for an orderly and stable modern society 
under continued CCP rule.47 Individual self-improvement and learning from role models are 
framed by the State via the media, entertainment and curricula as patriotic acts advancing 
national prosperity, unity and strength. The production and consumption of celebrity in China 
thus takes place in a discursive context in which “quality” and “civilization” symbolize 
prescribed ways of behaving that underpin Hu Jintao’s “harmonious and well-off society” and 
Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”. Yet, as Brownell points out, the discourse around “quality” and 
“civilization” has displaced the responsibility for progress to individuals, while masking the 
class structure and other systemic inequities that determine their access to the fruits of 
development.48 
Reform era economic development and the partial retreat of the State from many areas 
of life have resulted in greater prosperity and the expansion of individual freedoms. Yet, some 
scholars argue that the transition from socialist collectivism to competitive market socialism 
has also created an ideological void.49 Partially filled by a state-led “nationalist turn” post-
1989,50 it is manifest in a nationwide religious resurgence,51 the re-establishment of clan and 
temple organizations52 and the state-sanctioned revival of elements of Confucianism.53 The 
history of celebrity in the west is also closely associated with a “void,” created by the 
encroachment of alienating capitalist economic structures, the industrial production of culture 
                                                          
46 Jeffreys 2009. 
47 Tomba 2009. 
48 2001. 
49 Kipnis 2001. 
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and the contemporaneous decline in organized religion in the early Twentieth Century.54 
Scholars identified an “affective deficit in modern life” where direct social contact is replaced 
by para-social relations with celebrities, who provide an “illusion of intimacy”55 and are subject 
to the projection of “fantasies of belonging and fulfilment.”56 Recent research on fandom in 
China57 similarly suggests that celebrity engagement is a “vehicle for self-idealization and 
psychological reinforcement”58 and a site for identity and community formation.59 Whether 
prompted by state discourse or an unguided response to changing economic and social 
conditions, there is widespread enthusiasm for self-improvement in China and Chinese 
celebrities nourish the vogue for self-help or “success study” (chenggongxue 成功学) by 
portraying the value of hard work and learning in pursuit of a better life. From factory workers 
learning skills to move up the career ladder,60 rural migrants using technology to look and feel 
modern and urban61 to petty bourgeois (xiaokang 小康) adopting symbols of middle class 
lifestyles,62 self-improvement is a widespread endeavour. Magazine stories and celebrities’ 
communications on social media frequently emphasize the sacrifices and work ethic needed to 
become a successful performer, athlete or businessperson. The message conveyed by 
celebrities is that the system rewards perseverance, cultivation of talent and broadly compliant 
behaviours. 
Chinese celebrity is also “embedded within a CCP-led nationalistic project that 
encourages public pronouncements of unabashed patriotism,”63 with punishments and public 
abuse heaped on those associated with “unpatriotic acts.” Actress Zhang Ziyi, whose global 
                                                          
54 Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944. 
55 Turner 2013, 6. 
56 Rojek 2001, 35. 
57 Zhang 2016. 
58 Turner 2013, 23. 
59 Wang 2008. 
60 Chang 2010. 
61 Qiu 2009; Wallis 2013. 
62 Latham et al. 2006. 
63 Edwards and Jeffreys 2010, 15. 
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stardom is predicated on having become the “embodiment of the transformation of Chineseness 
in the age of global modernity,”64 was criticized in state media for playing the paramour of a 
Japanese man in Memoirs of a Geisha, a Hollywood production of an American novel. Zhang, 
a Global Ambassador for the Special Olympics, was accused of “betraying national loyalties” 
and subject to online abuse when naked images of her on set with Japanese co-star Ken 
Watanabe were posted online. In 2008, SARFT banned media coverage of Tang Wei (汤唯), 
a Chinese actress who starred in Taiwanese director Ang Lee’s (Li An李安) Lust, Caution (Se, 
Jie 色 , 戒 ), a film the central government said “glorified traitors and insulted patriots”. 
Numerous Taiwanese celebrities like pop stars Chou Tze-yu (Zhou Ziyu 周子瑜) and A-mei 
(Zhang Huimei 张惠妹）have been compelled by their industry employers to issue apologies 
for waving the flag or singing the anthem of the Republic of China. Others, like Hong Kong 
Cantopop singer Denise Ho (He Yunshi 何韵诗) have been blacklisted by the Ministry of 
Culture for associations with the Umbrella and Sunflower movements or “pro-independence” 
opinions.65 For individual celebrities, studios, agencies and the brands they represent, the threat 
of denied access to the Chinese market is economically significant and an incentive to moderate 
public pronouncements and avoid association with “sensitive” issues. By contrast, “celebrities 
who adhere to state ideals are rewarded handsomely.” 66  Fan Bingbing, for example, has 
occupied the top position in Forbes’ ranking of total annual income for Chinese celebrities in 
each of the last three years, reportedly earned 128 million RMB (£13.7 million) from film roles 
and endorsements in 2014.67 
 
                                                          
64 Kourelou 2010, 123. 
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Celebritization of the ordinary? Reality TV and the Internet 
In western democracies like the US and UK, where ubiquitous celebrity culture has “colonized 
the expectations of everyday life,”68 Turner characterizes the popularization of self-mediation 
and the celebritization of regular people via Reality TV as a “demotic turn.”69 Reflecting the 
broader entertainment industry in which it is situated, Reality TV in China is a highly controlled 
environment with substantial barriers to the participation of ordinary people in the celebrity-
making apparatus. Commercial experimentation with Reality TV was quickly contained by the 
state, as the case of Hunan Satellite TV’s Super Girl (Chaoji nüsheng 超级女声) illustrates. 
After propelling amateur singers Li Yuchun 李宇春 and Zhang Bichen 张碧晨 to stardom, 
Super Girl ended its three-series run in 2006, when SARFT, Party officials and state media 
denounced “the vulgar inclination of entertainment programs,” 70  which contravened the 
pedagogical role fundamental to the media and cultural industries.71 Unlike in the west, where 
extreme behaviours are encouraged, the undergrown Chinese Reality TV scene is closely 
controlled to ensure it reflects traditional values. In consequence, family oriented shows like 
Dad is Back (Baba huilai le爸爸回来了) and Where are We Going Dad? (Baba qu nar? 爸爸
去哪儿?) have competed with earnest dating shows like If You Are The One (Feicheng wurao 
非诚勿扰), where contestants displaying unseemly attitudes like materialism attract public and 
media criticism. Despite careful management, even these shows have fallen foul of SAAPRT.72  
In Chinese cyberspace, which despite an effective censorship regime is still a 
comparatively free space,73 there is evidence of an emerging “demotic” celebrity sphere where 
ordinary people “turn themselves into media content through celebrity culture.”74 The rise of 
                                                          
68 Turner 2006, 153. 
69 2013 
70 Miao 2011, 101. 
71 Keane 2013. 
72 Keane and Zhang 2017. 
73 Sullivan 2014. 
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“me-casting” technologies, the attraction of going viral and the quest for external validation 
through the accumulation of likes and followers on social media has popularized the pursuit of 
online celebrity (wanghong 网红 ). This includes the “camgirls” who nurture followings 
through online streaming sites,75 to bloggers and vloggers like exercise guru Zhang Jingqi 张
景琦 and idiosyncratic gaming critic Yi Xiaoxing 易小星. Reflecting early criticism of the 
inauthenticity of celebrity, there are also people “well-known for their well-knownness,”76 
celetoids like Guo Meimei 郭美美 or Zhang Zetian 章泽天, ordinary people whose short-lived 
celebrity arrived “accidently”. Rojek describes “the accelerated commodity life cycle of the 
celetoid” as an “industrial solution” to the problem of satisfying media and audience demands 
for consuming and pursuing celebrity.77  There is clearly abundant supply and demand: more 
than 300 dedicated streaming companies serve an audience of over 300 million people, 20 
percent of whom view live chat shows with amateur hosts (zhenren liaotianxiu 真人聊天秀).78  
Celebrification, which Rojek describes as a familiar mode of “cyberself-
presentation,”79 is evident in Chinese social media platforms used for “presenting the self,”80 
“prosuming” (simultaneous production and consumption) in the guise of internet parody (egao 
恶搞),81 publishing fan fiction82 and constructing online fan communities.83 Some users have 
gained fame and income from web-advertising and product endorsement deals from 
“performing” on streaming platforms like Meipai (美拍) and video-sharing sites like Kuaishou 
                                                          
75 Senft 2008. 
76 Boorstin 1961, 58. 
77 2001, 20–1. 
78 China Internet Network Information Center. 2017. “Di 39 ci Zhongguo hulianwang fazhan qingkuang tongji 
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(快手). From lifestyle gurus like Lingling 玲玲, gamers like JY Daishi JY 戴士 to irreverent 
social commentators like Papi Jiang (Jiang Yilei 姜逸磊), the popularization of “DIY celebrity” 
platforms allow Chinese desiring celebrity to sidestep gatekeepers in the media and 
entertainment industries. Technological affordances and “consumer” demand mean that the 
possibility of celebrity is no longer restricted to elite performers and graduates of state 
academies.  
Streaming platforms celebrate the ordinary, giving all manner of subculture enthusiasts, 
exhibitionists and talented (or not) amateurs the chance to experiment with an accessible 
celebrity-making apparatus. The streaming business is lucrative, growing and attracts 
substantial commercial investment. 84  However, the state control apparatus has responded 
quickly to the potential for video and streaming platforms to become a potentially subversive 
site for presenting, negotiating and challenging “orthodox” cultural meanings. In May 2017, 
the MOC shut down more than 30,000 live streaming hosts citing content they judged to be 
“vulgar, obscene, violent, superstitious, and damaging to the psychological health of 
juveniles.”85 The CAC launched strict new rules requiring companies to enforce controls on 
content broadcast on their streaming platforms.86 In June 2017, SAAPRT warned that online 
programming must “advance patriotism, extol the motherland and praise heroes” and not 
engage in “wasteful star-chasing.”87 These measures demonstrate that the state believes the 
informal celebrity sphere requires the same circumscriptive controls as its industrial cousin. 
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Internet celebrities may resemble carnival performers,88 but in a controlled society the carnival 
is also carefully regulated.   
 
Conclusion 
Celebrity is frequently overlooked in scholarly work on politics, society and culture in China. 
Furthermore, China is largely absent from the substantial, US- and UK-centric Celebrity 
Studies literature. Both absences are regrettable given the scale and distinct nature of China’s 
experience with celebrity in the reform era. Chinese celebrities have derived financial, cultural 
and symbolic capital through a combination of their professional roles, constant publicity and 
the influence that the crafted celebrity persona exerts on the “experience of everyday life and 
its implication in the construction and definition of cultural identity.”89 The State is acutely 
aware of this “celebrity power”, attributing a range of responsibilities that come with celebrity 
status and adding specific layers of regulation to individual celebrity conduct to reinforce the 
multidimensional controls prevailing over the media, internet, advertising, cultural industries 
and society. Harnessing the power of celebrity on the public consciousness to facilitate their 
goals to govern and seek economic gains, state and industry actors fabricate celebrities as 
exemplars of model behaviours relating to consumption, “middle class” and “traditional” 
values, patriotism and acceptance of the political regime.  
  Distinguished by multi-layered formal and informal institutions of control and the 
Party’s determination to maintain the “commanding heights” of media and cultural 
production,90 Chinese celebrity is different to the western societies that dominate the celebrity 
studies literature. For instance, due to the exigencies of State control and a vastly different 
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political culture, China has resisted the “celebritization of politics” that reached its apotheosis 
in the US with the election of celebrity businessman and Reality TV star Donald Trump to the 
American presidency in 2016. However, the Chinese celebrity industry is not unique. 
Celebrities in other contexts also serve multiple principals and occupy a liminal space between 
state, market and publics. Patriotism is expected of celebrities in other nations and the training 
and careful manufacture of performers is common to other Asian societies, notably Korea.91 
Like their democratic counterparts, the Communist Party has shown a growing appreciation of 
the utility of the mechanics of contemporary celebrity creation, incorporating lessons from 
professional PR, marketing and advertising into a nascent hybrid “pop-propaganda” system 
used to promote some state actors, state-sanctioned role models and “manage the message.” 
And despite distinct ideological, historical and social factors, not least the tension between the 
individualism inherent in the idea of “the star” and China’s collectivist cultural foundations,92 
young Chinese demonstrate a thirst for celebrities and have embraced online celebrity-making 
platforms. In sum, these factors make Chinese celebrity a fertile research area for scholars in 
both the China and Celebrity Studies fields.   
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